Guatemala

Guatemala - Compensation & Benefit Legislation

CAPITAL

Guatemala

CLIMATE

Tropical climate; hot and humid in the lowlands; cooler in the highlands.

LANGUAGES

Spanish 60%, and Amerindian languages 40% (more than 20 Amerindian languages, including Quiche, Cakchiquel, Kekchi, Mam, Garifuna, and Xinca).

LEGAL SYSTEM

Guatemala’s legal system is based on civil law system and has judicial review of legislative acts. Guatemala has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

CURRENCY

Guatemalan Quetzal and US Dollar (1 USD = 8.12140 GTQ as of April 15, 2002).

GUATEMALA - COST-OF-LIVING

ERI's Relocation Assessor is a recommended source for cost-of-living data.

GUATEMALA - EMBASSY/CONSULATES

U. S. Embassy at Guatemala City

7-01 Avenida de la Reforma, Zone 10

APO AA 34024

Guatemala City, Guatemala

Telephone: [502] 331-1541

Fax: [502] 334-8263

http://usembassy.state.gov/guatemala/

Embassy of Guatemala at Washington D.C.

2220 R Street N.W.

Washington D.C. 20008

Telephone: (202) 745-4952

Fax: (202) 745-1908

Email: info@guatemala-embassy.org

http://www.guatemala-embassy.org/

GUATEMALA - HOLIDAYS

New Year's Day (January 1)
Easter
Labor Day (May 1)
Army Day (June 30)
Independence Day (September 15)
Revolution Day (October 20)
All Saints' Day (November 1)
Christmas Eve (December 24)
Christmas (December 25)

New Year's Eve (December 31)

GUATEMALA - LEAVE

Maternity Leave: 12 weeks – 100% of pay (paid by employer 33%, and social security 67%).

GUATEMALA - MINIMUM AGE

The Constitution bars employment of minors under the age of 14 without written permission from the Ministry of Labor. However, the informal and agricultural sectors regularly employ children below this age, usually in small family enterprises.

(Section 6.d. Acceptable Conditions of Work, Guatemala – Report of Human Rights Practices, 2001, U.S. Department of State.)

GUATEMALA - MINIMUM REMUNERATION

The law sets minimum wages; however, noncompliance with minimum wage provisions in the rural and informal sectors is widespread. As minimum wage provisions have become more complex through inclusion of a monthly "incentive bonus" and as the minimum wage has risen during the year and with a deepening economic crisis affecting the coffee growing sector, noncompliance with the law, which was already high, also has risen. Advocacy groups that focus on rural sector issues estimate that more than half of workers engaged in day long employment in the rural sector do not receive the wages, benefits, and social security allocations required by law. Minimum wage laws do not extend to domestic workers.

In March 2000, the Congress mandated by decree an incentive bonus that augments the minimum wage by paying for each hour worked--0.6725 quetzals (approximately $0.09) per hour for agricultural workers and 0.64375 quetzals (approximately $0.08) per hour for industrial and other workers. The legal minimum wage for a regular 8-hour day then became 30.46 quetzals (approximately $3.93) for agricultural work and 32.82 quetzals (approximately $4.32) for service, industrial, and government sector work. On August 6, the Government decreed an increase in the mandatory monthly bonus for all workers to 250 quetzals (approximately $31.25) from a previous level of 162 quetzals (approximately $20.20) for agricultural workers and 154 quetzals (approximately $19.30) for non-agricultural workers.

The minimum wage was not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. According to the UNDP, at least 80 percent of the population, including approximately 60 percent of the employed, lives below the poverty line. The Ministry of Labor conducts inspections to monitor compliance with minimum wage provisions; however, the Ministry of Labor lacks the resources to enforce adequately the minimum wage law.

(Section 6.e. Acceptable Conditions of Work, Guatemala – Report of Human Rights Practices, 2001, U.S. Department of State.)

GUATEMALA - REMUNERATION

ERI's Geographic and Salary Assessors are recommended sources for international remuneration covering 189 countries.

GUATEMALA - REPORT OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2001, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE)

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

The Constitution and the Labor Code provide workers with freedom of association and the right to form and join trade unions; however, in practice the government does not enforce effectively labor laws to protect workers who exercise their rights. All workers have the right to form or join unions, including public sector employees, with the exception of members of the security forces. Approximately 2 percent of the work force is unionized. The Government does not control unions. There is no state interference in union activities; however, internal intelligence services may monitor the activities of some politically active union leaders. In April and May the National Legislature passed two sets of reforms to the national Labor Code. An ILO direct contacts mission headed by Adrian Goldin that visited the country in April noted that these reforms "constitute a significant step forward in the application of Conventions Nos. 87 and 98, in that they repeal or amend many of the provisions criticized by the Committee of Experts. The first set of the new labor law reforms redefined the mission of the Labor Ministry, from exercising "strict oversight to ensure unions operate legally" to guaranteeing "the free exercise of union rights." The May reforms also permitted industrial, or sectoral, unions. Legal recognition of a new industrial union requires that the membership constitute one-half plus one of the workers in an industry. Labor activists consider this requirement to be a nearly insurmountable barrier to the formation of new industrial unions.

The May reforms accord initial jurisdiction over labor law violations to the Labor Ministry, and set forth procedures for processing complaints, making initial determinations, and fining violators--new enforcement powers previously reserved to the labor courts. The Ministry of Labor may levy substantial fines for violations of labor rights; however, in practice, the Ministry has not used these new powers. Fines may be appealed to the labor courts. The labor inspection system remains ineffective, inadequate, and corrupt, despite continuing efforts at improvement. Low pay, the lack of a strong ethic of public service, and ineffective management prevent the Ministry from providing effective, honest service.

Retaliation--including firing, intimidation, and sometimes violence--by employers and others against workers who try to exercise internationally recognized labor rights is common and usually goes unsanctioned. In April the government accepted the visit of an ILO Direct Contacts Mission to investigate lack of progress in investigations of about a dozen killings of unionists between 1995 and 2000. In June the Prosecutor's Office assigned a Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Unionists and Journalists to review these and all new cases involving unionists. Clarification of these crimes would establish which of these crimes constitute violation of the right of association. The Prosecutor's Office is handling 38 cases against unionists, 19 cases were in the investigatory phase at year's end. One arrest warrant was issued against the Mayor of Tumbador, San Marcos Province, Fredy Radinel Vasquez Orozco. He was arrested for labor rights violations but was released. The ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association continues to monitor about a dozen allegations of serious violence against individuals for unionizing activities that lack credible investigations, prosecutions, or trials. The most common violation of freedom of association is the dismissal of workers for unionizing activity. Some workers who alleged illegal dismissal take their case to the labor courts and win injunctions of reinstatement. Appeals and reappeals by the employers, along with legal ploys such as reincorporation as a different entity, often prolong proceedings for years. The labor courts do not dismiss frivolous appeals, nor are their decisions enforced. According to Labor Ministry officials, the labor courts vindicate the majority of workers' claims against employers; however, employers comply with the court decisions in only a small number of cases, creating a climate of impunity. Often employers are not disciplined for not complying with legally binding court orders.

In 1998 DYMEL, SA was contracted to build a coal-fired power plant. During construction of the plant, DYMEL's workers, most contracted for the duration of the construction phase of the project, formed a union. DYMEL then fired 72 union organizers without required court permission. The workers went to court and won a judgment reinstating them with back pay. After appeals by DYMEL, the verdict was upheld by the Constitutional Court in May. Meanwhile, DYMEL had completed the project, reorganized its corporate identity to shelter itself from claims, and moved all assets and operations back to El Salvador. The workers began a hunger strike on the doorstep of the Presidential Offices in late November, which continued at year's end.

Throughout the economy, employees were reluctant to exercise their right of association for fear of reprisal by employers. Workers had little confidence that the responsible executive and judicial institutions would defend effectively their rights as employees when employers violated those rights. In addition the weakness of labor inspectors, the failures of the judicial system, poverty and lack of education, the legacy of violent repression of labor activists during the internal conflict, a climate of impunity, and the deep-seated hostility of the business establishment towards independent and self-governing labor associations constrained the exercise of worker rights. In addition to the ILO's criticism, MINUGUA's 4th Report on the Peace Process noted that "genuine trade union freedom does not exist" due to antiunion violence. It also reported a significant gap between the problems regarding workers' rights and the resources applied by the Government to solving these problems.

On December 21, Baudilio Cermeno Ramirez, the Organization Secretary of the Light and Energy Union, was murdered when leaving his home. The case is being investigated by the Special Prosecutor's Office. At year's end, no results of the investigation were available. While union groups called for a through investigation, there was no public evidence that the murder was politically motivated.

An investigation continued into the June 2000 killing of Oswald Monzon Lima, the Secretary General of a fuel drivers' union. He had been fired for forming a union at the trucking firm and for criticizing the corruption widespread in the firm.

An active "solidarismo" movement claims to have approximately 170,000 members in about 400 companies. Unions may operate legally in workplaces that have solidarity associations, and workers have the right to choose between the two or to belong to both. The Government views these associations as civic organizations that need not interfere with the functioning of trade unions. The Labor Code stipulates very clearly that trade unions have an exclusive right to negotiate work conditions on behalf of workers. However, unions charge that management promotes solidarity associations to avoid the formation of trade unions or to compete with existing labor unions. Representatives of most organized labor groups criticize these associations, asserting that they do not permit strikes, have inadequate grievance procedures, and are meant to displace genuine, independent trade unions and are employer-dominated. There were credible reports that some associations did not adhere to democratic principles.

The administrative process for unions to obtain legal status has been simplified over the past decade. In 1996 the Ministry of Labor reduced the number of steps needed to adjudicate union applications and mandated a deadline of 20-workdays for reaching a decision. Labor Code reforms adopted in April authorized the Labor Ministry to establish a free legal assistance service for workers who desire to unionize. Labor Code reforms adopted in May contained provisions designed to further simplify the Ministry's application and recognition process, and strengthen union members' ability to demand transparency in union activities. The Ministry of Labor registered 60 new unions during the year and accredited 120 new union elections during the same period. In 2000 The Labor Ministry granted legal status to 45 unions, and in 1999 there were 1,389 registered unions--401 in the public sector and 988 in the private sector.

The approximately 1,300 registered unions were generally independent of government and political party domination.

In March a trial court's 3-judge panel unanimously convicted 22 individuals (among them most of the leaders of the vigilante action) on charges of coercion and illegal detention for the October 1999 take over of a SITRABI banana workers union hall. All were acquitted of aggravated trespass, the third charge lodged against them. The court sentenced each of the 22 to terms of 3 years and 6 months, commutable by payment of fines. The fines varied depending on the income level of the individual convicted. After testifying at the trial, the SITRABI union leaders who were the principal targets of the vigilante assault fled the country for fear of retaliation. Leaders of the group repeatedly threatened to kill some of the union leaders. During the incident, about 20 rank and file union members were held captive. Various union leaders and rank and file members were pushed and beaten. Union leaders were forced to sign letters of resignation from their positions in the union and from their jobs. BANDEGUA had fired nearly 900 workers in September 1999, in violation of the contractual agreement in force between the enterprise and the trade union.

According to MINUGUA, law enforcement failures in this incident included police inaction as the incident took place and lapses in applying the Code of Criminal Procedure during the indictment phase. In June 2000, the court of first instance had rejected charges of abduction, intimidation, aggravated trespass, and aggravated illegal detention sought by the prosecution and instead arraigned 24 defendants on lesser charges of trespassing, detention, and coercion.

In October 2000, the Ministry of Labor facilitated the completion of a collective bargaining agreement between the SITRABI union and the contractors who had taken up operating the plantations on which the 900 workers previously had worked as direct-hire BANDEGUA employees. In February BANDEGUA and its remaining direct-hire workforce agreed to a collective bargaining agreement. Despite some efforts by BANDEGUA, its independent contractors, and the SITRABI union, labor relations were marred by wildcat strikes and angry confrontations between workers and management. The union alleged that BANDEGUA and its independent producers had failed to meet some of their commitments under their respective collective bargaining agreements, including payment of mandatory social security taxes and provision of enough piecework to permit workers to earn the minimum wage. In addition, these agreements called for the reinstatement of the fired workers. According to SITRABI, by year's end, this issue was resolved, and no former BANDEGUA workers were seeking reemployment.

On July 18 and 19, antiunion workers attacked union organizers involved in a legally registered union organizing drive in the Choi Shin/Cimatextiles maquila plants. Credible reports allege that management through floor supervisors planned and organized the antiunion violence (consisting of beatings and bottle and rock throwing which caused several minor injuries) and intimidation. The police, claiming that the mob was out of control, refused to enter the factory to protect the workers under attack. Twenty-two unionists filed a complaint with the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Unionists. During the week following the violence, the Ministry of Labor brokered two agreements between union organizers, Choi Shin/Cimatextiles management, and the maquila employers association (VESTEX). Those agreements included management commitment to recognize the new unions and respect the workers' right to organize, reinstatement without loss of status and safe return to work for unionists, internal (company) sanctions of aggressor workers, and pledges by the company to assure all employees that it had no intention of closing because of the formation of unions. Subsequent to the antiunionist violence in July, union supporters and NGOs credibly alleged an ongoing low-intensity intimidation campaign by management, intended to limit participation in union organizing activities. Actions alleged have included physical harassment of a union leader by a private security agent on company property, force resignations and firing of some union members, threats of blacklisting, shifting production to other facilities, and creating an antiunion climate by promoting rumors that the factories would close as a result of unionization.

Violations of the right of association also occurred in the public sector. In September MINUGUA highlighted the cases of intimidation, threats, and illegal firings of municipal workers by public officials in Cuilapa, Santa Rosa; Guastatoya, El Progresso; Tecpan, Chimaltenango; and La Gomera, Escuintla. In addition, the management of Ministry of Health hospitals in the capital and in Cuilapa, Santa Rosa, refused to recognize union leaders or tried to replace them with others, and the Ministry has not complied with terms of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the previous Administration.

Workers have the right to strike. However, the very low level of unionization and procedural hurdles make legal strikes rare. The reforms adopted in May rescinded the provision--long noted by the ILO as an unwarranted constraint on the right of association--that prohibited seasonal agricultural workers from striking during harvest time. The Labor Code reforms adopted in April reduced from two-thirds to one half plus one the number of a firm's workers required to call a legal strike. The Labor Code requires that a labor court consider whether or not workers are conducting themselves peacefully and have exhausted available mediation before ruling on the legality of a strike. The Labor Code reforms adopted in May created new procedures that workers in essential services (health, utility, and communications) must follow to exercise legally the right to strike. However, other changes in the Labor Code gave the President and his cabinet the power to suspend any strike deemed "gravely prejudicial to the country's essential activities and public services." Employers may suspend or fire workers for absence without leave if authorities have not recognized their strike as legal. The strike regulation law calls for binding arbitration if no agreement is reached after 30 days of negotiation. For a strike to be declared, workplace election must be held, and 50 percent plus one person present, including workers and management, must vote in favor of the strike. The union then must petition a labor court for permission to strike. The judge calls the petitioners and employer representatives before the court and forms a Conciliation Tribunal to seek resolution of the conflict. If no agreement is reached, the parties can go to binding arbitration, or the judge may rule on the legality of the strike. In practice, this can be a lengthy process, and few strikes are upheld.

There were no significant legal strikes during the year. However, a 24-hour nationwide demonstration involving work stoppage was called by labor unions and then joined by employers, to protest Government plans to increase the value-added tax. The strike closed most factories and businesses for a day, but did not generate large crowds of protesters. However, there was rioting in two provincial capitals.

The Labor Code provides for the right of employers to fire union workers for cause, permits workers to appeal their dismissal to the labor courts, and requires the reinstatement within 24 hours of any unionized worker fired without cause. The Labor Code also prohibits employers from firing any member of the executive committee of a union and also protects them for 12 months after they are no longer on the executive committee. An employer may fire a member of the union's executive committee for cause only after a trial in a labor court and issuance of a court resolution. Even in clear-cut cases, labor laws have not been enforced adequately. Despite governmental, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to restructure and modernize the labor court system, the system remained ineffective. There are 20 labor courts--7 in the capital and 13 located elsewhere around the country. An additional nine courts address labor issues, primarily appeals, as part of their jurisdiction. The weakness of the judicial system as a whole, the severe shortage of competent judges and staff, a heavy backlog of undecided cases, and failure to enforce effectively court rulings, all contribute to the labor courts' lack of credibility and effectiveness. The small number of competent and motivated labor inspectors and the lack of training and resources devoted to detecting and investigating Labor Code violations compound the weakness of the labor courts. UNICEF, the ILO, and MINUGUA continue to urge the Government to speed up the administration of justice to ensure the strict enforcement of labor laws. MINUGUA singled out the Third Judge for Labor for egregious delays in legal procedures stemming from a dispute involving a bank workers union dating to 1997. The Judge took more than 3 years to convoke the parties before a conciliation tribunal, which should have taken place within 36 hours.

However, government efforts to improve the labor inspection system, begun in 2000, continued. After substantially expanding the size of the inspector corps in 2000, the Ministry of Labor increased its rate of inspections and fired some incompetent or corrupt inspectors. Some of these inspections involved a campaign to improve compliance with labor standards in the in-bond processing for export or "maquila" sector. Others focused on ensuring compliance with minimum wage provisions.

Under the revised Labor Code, complaints can be heard at the Ministry of Labor rather than requiring that inspectors travel to each work site. The Ministry also instituted a set of complaint assistance, small claims mediation, and information providing initiatives designed to provide better services to workers. The Ministry continued its educational campaign on worker rights (especially the rights of minors and women), which included a campaign of radio spots and the provision of some educational materials in indigenous languages. In an effort to improve enforcement of the Labor Code outside the capital, the Ministry of Labor continued to decentralize its operations. Seven of the Ministry's offices outside the capital have been accorded regional authority. These regional offices, in addition to labor inspectors, also include specialists in women and workplace issues, management-worker relations/conflict resolution, and minor workers/child labor issues. The Labor Ministry plans to give these regional offices supervisory authority over branch offices in the departmental capitals of each region.

The Human Rights Ombudsman's office for economic and social issues receives complaints related to violation of internationally recognized worker rights. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office can investigate union complaints and issue a statement, but the office has no enforcement powers beyond attempting to resolve the situation through publicity and moral suasion. The Ombudsman made public statements about labor conditions in various sectors of the economy.

Unions may and do form federations and confederations and affiliate with international organizations.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

Workers have the right to organize and bargain collectively; however, the small number of unionized workers limits the practice of collective bargaining. The prevailing business culture ignores labor contracts because, in practice, they are largely unenforceable due to the weak, cumbersome and corrupt legal system. Labor Code reforms adopted in May reduced from two-thirds to one-half plus one the number of union members required to approve a collective bargaining agreement. The ILO Committee of Experts had called for this change; as well as a modification of the Labor Code requirement that the employer submit any new or modified collective bargaining agreement to the Labor Ministry within 15 days of an accord between union and management. This provision remains in practice. The ILO also noted other reforms necessary to provide for full exercise of the right to organize and bargain collectively.

The requirement that 25 percent of the workers in a factory or business must be union members for collective bargaining to take place, lack of experience, and management's aversion to sharing power with workers also limit the practice of collective bargaining. Management and labor honored collective contracts at some firms; in others, management, and sometimes labor, chose to ignore selected provisions of binding collective bargaining agreements. According to the Ministry of Labor, 23 collective bargaining agreements were registered during the year. Most workers, even those organized in trade unions, do not have collective contracts documenting their wages and working conditions, nor do they have individual contracts as required by law. According to a November 2000 study by the Association for Research and Social Studies, only 10 percent of workers have a contract duly registered with the Labor Ministry as required by law.

The Labor Ministry has worked to promote the restructuring of labor relations in enterprises by encouraging labor-management cooperation and to bring about a "culture of negotiation" as called for by the Peace Accord on Socioeconomic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation. Despite these efforts, productive, good faith negotiations between employer and worker representatives have been the exception rather than the rule. The majority of unions that engaged in collective bargaining during the year reported that some employers continued to reject the underlying premise of collective bargaining--that power in the workplace can be shared according to a contract between the employees and company management for the benefit of both.

The law protects workers from retribution for forming unions and for participating in trade union activities, but enforcement of these provisions is weak. Many employers routinely seek to circumvent Labor Code provisions to resist unionization. An ineffective legal system and inadequate penalties for violations have hindered enforcement of the right to form unions and participate in trade union activities in the past and perpetuates the violence that workers face if they attempt to exercise their rights.

The Labor Code prohibits employers from firing workers for union organizing and protects them from being fired for 60 days following notification to the Labor Ministry that a union is being formed. Thereafter, they can be fired for cause, unless they are members of the union's executive committee. During labor conflicts, unions frequently seek a labor court injunction, which prohibits firing without approval of a judge until the conflict is resolved. Although the Labor Code provides that workers fired illegally for union activity should be reinstated within 24 hours, in practice employers have filed a series of appeals or simply defied judicial orders for reinstatement. The Labor Code reforms adopted in May significantly increased--to the equivalent of 10-50 times the current minimum monthly wage--penalties for defying such orders. These reforms went into effect in July; however, effective utilization of these enhanced enforcement powers of the Ministry of Labor has proved difficult. The Labor Ministry, and its corps of labor inspectors in particular, continues to suffer from a lack of respect from employers, inadequate resources, and corruption (see Section 6.a.). As of November 7, the Labor Ministry reported that of 1,371 complaints received since passage of the May reforms to the labor code, only 156 received financial sanctions. Of those, only six had been paid at year's end. None of the fines amounted to more than five times the monthly minimum wage.

The Ministry of Labor has reorganized its labor inspection system to permit some complaints to be heard at the Ministry of Labor rather than requiring that inspectors travel to each work site. The Ministry instituted a set of complaint assistance, small claims mediation, and informational initiatives designed to provide better services to workers. The Ministry continued its educational campaign on worker rights (especially the rights of minors and women), which included a campaign of radio announcements and the provision of some documents in indigenous languages. In an effort to improve enforcement of the Labor Code outside the capital, the Ministry of Labor continued to decentralize its operations. Seven of the Ministry's offices outside the capital have been accorded regional authority. These regional offices, in addition to labor inspectors, also include specialists in women and workplace issues, management-worker relations/conflict resolution, and minor workers/child labor issues. The Labor Ministry plans to give these regional offices supervisory authority over branch offices in the departmental capitals of each region. The number of official inspections continues to increase, from 431 in 1999 to 4,127 in 2000 and 5,703 from January to October.

Labor laws and regulations apply throughout the country, including in the few export processing zones (EPZ's). (Maquilas that make garments for export operate under an EPZ-like regime, although they are not located in distinctly established areas.) The laws governing the EPZ's do not infringe on fundamental rights to organize trade unions or bargain collectively. However, there are no collective bargaining agreements between employers and any of the more 80,000 workers in the export processing zones. Union leaders often cite their inability to organize workers in these zones on employer intimidation and pressure as well as unofficial restrictions on their access to the EPZ's.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The Constitution bars forced or compulsory labor; however, women are trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Trade union leaders and human rights groups charge that work requirements sometimes forced workers to work overtime, often without premium pay. The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by children, but they are covered by the general constitutional provision. Forced or bonded labor by children generally did not occur; however, children were trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation.

d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment

According to the National Statistics Institute, from 1998 to 1999 there were 326,095 children doing paid work, and 495,780 doing chores in the home. An estimated 80 percent of work accidents involve 15 to 18 year old workers who lack proper safety training. The law prohibits minors from night work and extra hours (the legal workday for minors under the age of 14 is 6 hours; for minors 14 to 17 years of age, it is 7 hours), from work in establishments where alcoholic beverages are served, and from work in unhealthy or dangerous conditions. The ILO's International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor is active in the fireworks industry. The Labor Ministry estimated that approximately 10 percent of the children in this industry work illegally in factories, while younger children, under the age of 14, typically work at home on piecework taken in by their families. In July 2000, an explosion in a family-run home fireworks workshop killed three siblings, including a 13-year-old who were working in their father's illegal fireworks factory in San Raymundo Sacatepequez was typical of accidents that occur regularly in the informal cottage fireworks industry. According to press reports an average of 25 persons, the majority minors, suffer burns and amputations for accidents in the fabrication of fireworks. For example, on December 10, eight persons died in a clandestine fireworks factory in Villa Nueva, near the capital. The victims included a 12-year-old child and an 18-month-old child. Another 12-year-old survived with third degree burns. Between 3,000 and 5,000 children were employed in the illegal cottage-based fireworks industry.

Laws governing the employment of minors are not enforced effectively, due to the weakness of the labor inspection and labor court systems. The Association for Girls and Boys in Central America estimates that approximately 2 million children work in the region. The majority of child laborers work in agriculture (family farms, coffee, and sugar cane harvesting), while others work in domestic service, construction, various family businesses, stone quarrying, rock-breaking, fireworks manufacturing, shining shoes, begging, performing in the streets, or other jobs. Between 1995 and 1999, the Ministry of Labor issued 507 permits authorizing the employment of minors. The Ministry of Labor's efforts to reduce the number of these permits resulted in an increased number of minors applying for work with falsified age documents. Many children under the age of 14 work without legal permission and are vulnerable to exploitation. Their illegal status makes them ineligible to receive social benefits, social insurance, vacations, or severance pay, and they often earn salaries below the minimum wage.

The Labor Ministry has a program to educate minors, their parents, and employers on the rights of minors in the labor market. In 1992 the Government formed the Child Worker Protection Unit within the Ministry of Labor, which enforces labor restrictions on child labor, and educates minors, their parents, and employers on the rights of minors in the labor market. In 2000 the Ministry of Labor, with the support of a group of NGO's, finalized a National Plan for the Prevention and Eradication of Child Labor and Protection of Adolescent Workers. In July the Ministry launched a national campaign to eliminate the worst forms of child labor. In September the Government ratified ILO Convention 182. The Government's main action to implement Convention 182 was the Cabinet's approval of the National Plan to Eradicate Child Labor in March.

The labor law does not specifically prohibit bonded labor by children; however, the Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor. Bonded labor by children generally did not occur; however, children were trafficked into prostitution.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

The Ministry of Labor oversees a tripartite committee, made up of formal sector representatives of labor and management, that makes recommendations for increases in the minimum wage. In the event that agreement is not reached in the tripartite commission, the Government may decree such increases. The Labor Code reforms adopted in May placed responsibility for drafting the decrees setting new minimum wage levels, should there be no consensual proposal submitted by the tripartite commission, on the Labor Ministry.

On December 16, 2000, a minimum wage increase, promulgated by Executive Branch decree after the tripartite commission was unable to reach a consensus, took effect. This decree raised the minimum daily wage for agricultural work by $0.45 (3.46 quetzals) to $3.24 (25.08 quetzals). It raised the minimum daily wage for service, industrial, and government sector work by $0.49 (3.82 quetzals) to $3.57 (27.67 quetzals). In March 2000, the Congress mandated by decree an incentive bonus that augments the minimum wage by paying for each hour worked--$0.09 (0.6725 quetzals) per hour for agricultural workers and $0.08 (0.64375 quetzals) per hour for industrial and other workers. The legal minimum wage for a regular 8-hour day then became $3.93 (30.46 quetzals) for agricultural work and $4.32 (32.82 quetzals) for service, industrial, and government sector work. On August 6, the Government decreed an increase in the mandatory monthly bonus for all workers to $31.25 (250 quetzals) from a previous level of $20.20 (162 quetzals) for agricultural workers and $19.30 (154 quetzals) for non-agricultural workers.

The legal workday is 8 hours and the workweek is 44 hours, but this is not respected, and a tradition of longer hours remains in place. These limits do not apply to domestic workers. The Labor Code requires a weekly paid rest period of at least 24 hours. Trade union leaders and human rights groups charge that work requirements sometimes forced workers to work overtime, often without premium pay. Labor inspectors report uncovering numerous instances of such abuses, but the lack of stiff fines or strong regulatory sanctions, as well as inefficiencies in the labor court system and enforcement of court orders, have inhibited adequate enforcement of the law.

Occupational health and safety standards are inadequate. Many of the provisions of the applicable law--dating to 1957--are archaic, making enforcement problematic. During the year, as part of its effort to address this situation, the Ministry of Labor participated in a number of regional international initiatives intended to sensitize employers and workers to health and safety risks in the workplace. The Labor Ministry provides training courses for labor inspectors in health and safety standards, and has given such training priority despite scarce resources.

Enforcement of occupational health and safety standards that do exist and could be applied reasonably is weak. When serious or fatal industrial accidents occur, the authorities often fail to fully investigate and assign responsibility for negligence, if any. Employers rarely are sanctioned for having failed to provide a safe workplace; however, the authorities did suspend one maquila operation for safety shortcomings, and threatened about a dozen others with a suspension of operations if they failed to improve safety conditions. Legislation requiring companies with more than 50 employees to provide onsite medical facilities for their workers has not been well enforced; however, most large employers did provide such facilities for their employees. The fireworks industry is particularly hazardous. Workers have the legal right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without reprisal. However, few workers are willing to jeopardize their jobs by complaining about unsafe working conditions.

A report by the Women's Rights Division of Human Rights Watch, alleged that women workers, especially in the domestic and maquila for-export manufacturing sector, suffer from high rates of discrimination and sexual harassment. One third of a sample of 29 domestic workers reported sexual harassment at work, according to the report. Labor law exempts domestic workers from the right to an 8-hour workday and the 48-hour workweek, provides domestics only limited rights to national holidays and weekly rest, and "by and large" denies domestics the right to employee health care under the national social security system. While the labor code stipulates that all workers have the right to the minimum wage, domestic workers are denied this right by executive decrees.

The report alleged that maquilas often obligate women to reveal whether they are pregnant as a condition of employment, either through questions on job applications, in interviews, or through physical examinations. Approximately 80 percent of the 80,000 maquila workers are women.

f. Trafficking in Persons

The law specifically prohibits trafficking and smuggling of persons; however, trafficking in women and children is a problem. The country is a source and transit country for international trafficking of persons. In a few cases, it is also a destination country. Trafficked persons come mainly from other Central American countries including El Salvador and Ecuador. Victims trafficked to Guatemala are usually young women or children who are trafficked for sexual exploitation. Most of the minors brought to the country are trafficked for sexual exploitation and placed in poor surroundings and paid low salaries.

The Government is making significant efforts to combat trafficking despite resource constraints and endemic corruption. The law specifically prohibits trafficking and smuggling of persons. The Government investigates trafficking cases; however, there have been no prosecutions of trafficking cases since victims often fail to press charges due to a cumbersome judicial system. Prison sentences for traffickers are commutable. The Government does not assist or protect victims of trafficking, although victims are not treated as criminals. The Government has conducted antitrafficking and antismuggling public awareness campaigns, and it provides limited funding to NGO's dedicated to preventing trafficking.

GUATEMALA - SOCIAL SECURITY

Social Security Office of International Programs:

http://www.ssa.gov/SSA_Home.html

GUATEMALA - STANDARD WORKWEEK

The legal workday is 8 hours and the workweek is 44 hours, but this is not respected, and a tradition of longer hours remains in place. These limits do not apply to domestic workers.

The Labor Code requires a weekly paid rest period of at least 24 hours.

(Section 6.e. Acceptable Conditions of Work, Guatemala – Report of Human Rights Practices, 2001, U.S. Department of State.)